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A state court can generally assert jurisdiction over a civil
suit arising out of Indian Country1 where state civil jurisdiction
1) is not preempted by federal law and 2) does not infringe upon
tribal rights of self-government.2 The Supreme Court has de-
clared that the infringement prong of this infringement-preemp-
tion test requires an analysis of both state and tribal interests:
state courts can protect a state's interest up to the point where
state authority affects the "right of reservation Indians to make
their own laws and be ruled by them."' State courts have little
difficulty ascertaining the state's interest in a given controversy,
but they have shown less aptitude for determining and upholding
tribal interests. Indeed, they often act as if their authority were
supreme, as if they existed in a world without Indian tribes.4
The "no law" cases illustrate how courts have struggled to
properly characterize tribal rights of self-government without the
aid of a principled framework for defining tribal interests.5 In
these cases, courts must determine whether state court jurisdic-
t BA. 1991, Emory University; J.D. Candidate 1994, The University of Chicago.
1 "Indian Country" is a term of art.
"Indian Country"... means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation
under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issu-
ance of any patent, and including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b)
all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether
within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or
without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which
have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.
18 USC §1151 (1988).
2 White Mountain Apache Tribe v Bracker, 448 US 136, 142 (1980).
' McClanahan v Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 US 164, 171-72 (1973), quoting
Williams v Lee, 358 US 217, 220 (1959).
" In the context of jurisdictional controversies, a tribe is a group of Indians protected
by a trust relationship with the federal government and recognized as having the powers
of self-government. Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 6-7 (US GPO, 1942)
("Handbook").
' Frank Pommersheim, The Crucible of Sovereignty: Analyzing Issues of Tribal
Jurisdiction, 31 Ariz L Rev 329, 351-55 (1989) (describing the "no law" problem and
collecting cases).
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tion impermissibly infringes upon tribal rights of self-government
when a tribe has not legislated on an issue or has not endorsed a
remedy to execute a judgment granted under state law-when
there seemingly is "no (tribal) law." One line of cases holds that
the application of state law impinges upon tribal sovereignty only
when the tribe has explicitly addressed the issue.6 Another line
of cases compares the tribal rights of self-government to state
sovereignty, holding that state civil jurisdiction can impermis-
sibly infringe upon tribal governmental authority even where the
state's assertion of jurisdiction contravenes no explicit assertions
of tribal law.' These conflicting interpretations of the tribal
rights of self-government have magnified the unpredictability and
general jurisdictional confusion surrounding the enforcement of
state court orders against Indian defendants.'
This Comment proposes an alternative approach to the "no
law" problem, an approach inspired by the Supreme Court's
elaboration on the tribal rights of self-government in Montana v
United States.' In Montana, the Court suggested that state court
civil jurisdiction over an action involving an Indian party may
improperly infringe the tribal rights of self-government where the
state's exercise of authority "threatens or has some direct effect
on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or
welfare of the tribe."' ° This approach recognizes that while
tribal rights of self-government have been recognized as a matter
of federal policy," they are actually grounded in the inherent
right of self-determination the tribes enjoyed as nations prior to
the arrival of European colonists. 2 If courts faithfully applied
the Montana conception of tribal rights of self-government, the
' See, for example, Little Horn State Bank v Stops, 170 Mont 510, 555 P2d 211, 214
(1976); First v LaRoche, 247 Mont 465, 808 P2d 467, 472 (1991); R.G. v W.M.B., 159 Wis
2d 662, 465 NW2d 221, 224 (Wis App 1990); Jacobs v Jacobs, 138 Wis 2d 19, 405 NW2d
668, 672 (Wis App 1987).
See, for example, Joe v Marcum, 621 F2d 358, 361-62 (10th Cir 1980); United
States v Morris, 754 F Supp 185, 187-88 (D NM 1991); Begay v Roberts, 167 Ariz 375, 807
P2d 1111, 1117 (Ariz App 1990).
8 Although the literature employs various terms to describe the indigenous people of
North America, this Comment uses the term "Indian." In the context ofjurisdictional con-
troversies, an Indian is a member of a federally recognized tribe. United States v
Broncheau, 597 F2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir 1979).
9 450 US 544 (1981).
'o Id at 566.
" Rosebud Sioux Tribe v South Dakota, 900 F2d 1164, 1174 (8th Cir 1990); Jane M.
Smith, Republicanism, Imperialism, and Sovereignty: A History of the Doctrine of Tribal
Sovereignty, 37 Buff L Rev 527, 574-75 (1988/89).
" See Worcester v Georgia, 31 US (6 Pet) 515, 557-61 (1832).
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resolution of "no law" state/tribal jurisdictional conflicts would be
clear: even where the tribal code does not provide a remedy, state
court jurisdiction is invalid because it violates the "political
integrity" of tribal councils and undermines the authority of the
tribal courts.
This Comment begins by surveying the development of the
infringement-preemption test in Supreme Court Indian law
jurisprudence. Next, it outlines the lower court cases that ad-
dress the particularly difficult "no law" problem. Finally, this
Comment applies the understanding developed in Montana to
state/tribal court jurisdictional conflicts. The Comment concludes
that tribal code silence should speak as loudly as any express
legislative or judicial pronouncement, especially where state
court jurisdiction interferes with the development of tribal com-
mon law.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S JURISPRUDENCE ON TRIBAL RIGHTS OF
SELF-GOVERNMENT
The Supreme Court's vision of tribal sovereignty has evolved
with the changes in the political relationship between Indian
tribes and the development of tribal political and legal institu-
tions. The Court has held consistently, however, that tribes pos-
sess rights of self-government and have authority over Indian
Country to the exclusion of state power. This Section describes
the Supreme Court's efforts to give legal substance to tribal sov-
ereignty.
A. Tribal Rights of Self-Government Trump State Authority
The Supreme Court first addressed whether a state could
enforce its laws within Indian Country in Worcester v Georgia."
In an opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, the Court held that
Georgia could not assert jurisdiction over Cherokee territory
because the federal statutes and treaties regulating trade with
the Indian nations recognized each Indian nation as an indepen-
" 31 US 515. Georgia officials arrested Samuel A. Worcester, a missionary from
Vermont, for entering and residing within the boundaries of the Cherokee nation without
express permission from the State of Georgia. Worcester challenged the validity and
authority of Georgia law within Cherokee territory. For an excellent overview of the po-
litical history surrounding the Cherokee cases, see Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases:
A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 Stan L Rev 500 (1969); Francis Paul Prucha, 1
The Great Father 191-213 (Nebraska, 1984); Note, The Cherokee Cases: The Fight to Save
the Supreme Court and the Cherokee Indians, 17 Am Ind L Rev 291 (1992).
1994]
The University of Chicago Law Review
dent political entity-a sovereign entity vested with the right of
self-determination.'4 Moreover, the Cherokee Nation's sovereign-
ty was not a product of its treaties with the United States gov-
ernment, but rather a necessary prerequisite to enter into those
treaties. 5 The Supreme Court has implicitly followed the rea-
soning of Worcester to find that tribal rights of self-government
are reflected in, but not created by, federal treaties and stat-
'utes."6 According to Chief Justice Marshall, tribal sovereignty
restricts the full exercise of state authority within state borders
because tribal independence preceded the formation of the states
themselves. Indian nations possessed the inherent rights of sov-
ereignty because they were "separated from Europe" and "inde-
pendent of each other and of the rest of the world." 7 Thus nei-
ther colonization nor the creation of the federal system dimin-
ished the Indians' right to be free of interference from state
law. 8
Chief Justice Marshall's sweeping affirmation of tribal rights
of self-government against state infringement in Worcester did
not diminish federal authority. The Doctrine of Conquest 9 and
the Supremacy Clause" give the federal government ample pow-
er to limit the full exercise of tribal sovereignty. The plenary
powers of Congress include the power to restrict tribal rights of
self-government to maintain external relations; for example,
Congress can preclude tribes from entering into treaties or main-
taining military forces.2' Because the federal government can ef-
fectively deny Indian nations their inherent sovereignty, Chief
Justice Marshall came to describe Indian tribes as "domestic
dependent nations."22
Worcester, 31 US at 556-57.
11 Id at 559-61.
16 See, for example, White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 US at 143.
11 Worcester, 31 US at 542-43.
18 Id at 559-61.
'9 See Johnson v McIntosh, 21 US (8 Wheat) 543, 574 (1823). See also Cohen, Hand-
book at 93 (cited in note 4) (War powers "underlay much of the federal power exercised
over Indian land and Indians during.the early history of the Republic. In international
law conquest brings legal power to govern.").
20 US Const, Art VI, cl 2. See also the Commerce Clause, US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 3
(Congress has power "[t]o regulate commerce ... with the Indian tribes"), and the Treaty
Clause, US Const, Art II, § 2, cl 2, interpreted as granting power to make treaties with
Indian tribes in United States v Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 US 188 (1876).
21 See Cohen, Handbook at 274 n 64.
Cherokee Nation v Georgia, 30 US (5 Pet) 1, 17 (1831). If Congress is to limit the
tribal rights of self-government, however, Congress must do so explicitly. In Ex Parte
Crow Dog, 109 US 556, 572 (1883), the Supreme Court held that "a clear expression of the
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The Supreme Court returned to the issue of state/tribal juris-
dictional conflict in the 1959 case of Williams v LeeY The Court
reaffirmed Worcester's protection of tribal sovereignty, concluding
that the tribal rights of self-determination are an essential con-
sideration in state/tribal jurisdictional conflicts. Where Congress
has not narrowed the tribal rights of self-government, "the ques-
tion has always been whether the state action infringed on the
right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled
by them." '4 By framing the central issue in terms of "infringe-
ment" on the tribal rights of self-government, Williams affirmed
Chief Justice Marshall's notion that tribal political independence
is a singularly sufficient basis for proscribing the extension of
state civil jurisdiction into Indian Country.
In McClanahan v Arizona State Tax Commission,' howev-
er, the Court shifted the focus of inquiry in jurisdictional conflict
cases from whether a state's action infringed upon the tribal
rights of self-government to whether state civil jurisdiction con-
tradicted the federal law governing federal tribal relations.
[T]he trend has been away from the idea of inherent Indian
sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance
on federal pre-emption. The modern cases thus tend to avoid
reliance on platonic notions of Indian sovereignty and to look
instead to the applicable treaties and statutes which define
the limits of state power.26
McClanahan left unclear both the usefulness of the Williams
infringement test and the continued significance of Chief Justice
Marshall's reasoning in Worcester. McClanahan did not explicitly
invalidate the Williams infringement test, but by focusing on
whether federal law preempted the state action, the opinion re-
duced the capacity of the tribal rights of self-government to pre-
clude state authority. Tribal sovereignty continued to be a rele-
vant component in the analysis of state/tribal jurisdictional con-
intention of Congress" was required to permit federal territorial court jurisdiction over a
criminal case involving only Indian parties. Congress responded by passing the Major
Crimes Act, 23 Stat 362, 385 (1885), giving federal courts jurisdiction over certain crimes
committed by Indians in Indian Country regardless of the race of the victim. Subsequent-
ly, in United States v Kagama, 118 US 375 (1886), the Supreme Court found the Major
Crimes Act a valid exercise of Congressional authority, upholding the power of Congress
to regulate conduct between Indians in Indian Country.
23 358 US 217 (1959).
24 Id at 220 (emphasis added).
25 411 US 164 (1973).
' Id at 172 (citations and footnotes omitted).
1994]
The University of Chicago Law Review
flicts, but it appeared "relegated to a pleasant doctrine slowly
vanishing into ambiguity."
2 7
The Supreme Court confronted the confusion generated by
Williams and McClanahan in White Mountain Apache Tribe v
Bracker.28 The Supreme Court held that both tribal rights to
self-government and federal preemption of state authority are
relevant considerations in the resolution of state/tribal jurisdic-
tional disputes.29 Thus, White Mountain Apache recognized the
importance of tribal sovereignty in the resolution of state/tribal
jurisdictional conflicts and reestablished sovereignty rights as a
bar to the extension of state authority into Indian Country."
B. Montana v United States: Guidance for the Infringement Test
Tribal rights of self-government and inherent tribal sover-
eigrity have remained vague concepts throughout the modern era.
Williams did not articulate what tribal interests are to be taken
into account when applying the infringement test. But in Mon-
tana v United States, while addressing the issue of civil jurisdic-
tion in Indian Country and the inherent rights of a tribe to regu-
late internal affairs, the Supreme Court outlined the essential
elements of the tribal rights of self-government."
A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil au-
thority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within
its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some
direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security,
or the health or welfare of the tribe.
The Montana Court's own application of this "test"" narrowed,
' Vine Deloria, Jr. and Clifford M. Lytle, American Indians, American Justice 205-07
(Texas, 1983).
2 448 US 136 (1980).
29 Id at 142-43.
3 Id at 142, quoting Williams, 358 US at 220. See also New Mexico v Mescalero
Apache Tribe, 462 US 324, 334 & n 16 (1983) ("inherent tribal sovereignty" may limit
state authority).
3' 450 US 544 (1981).
32 Id at 566.
' Professor Pommersheim has correctly stated that Montana does not establish a
bright-line test for resolving tribal jurisdictional issues. Rather, Montana only enumerates
the critical broad elements of tribal self-government to be considered when applying the
Williams infringement test. Pommersheim, 31 Ariz L Rev at 345 (cited in note 5). None-
theless, this Comment will refer to these elements (political integrity, economic security,
and the health or welfare of the tribe) as the Montana "test" because of the helpful
elaboration and development they provide for the Williams infringement inquiry.
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rather than broadened, tribal rights of self-government; the
Court held that the inherent tribal rights of self-government do
not include the power to regulate the conduct of non-Indians on
land owned by non-Indians within reservation boundaries.' The
Supreme Court tempered its decision, however, by emphasizing
that Indian tribes retain the authority to exercise civil jurisdic-
tion over non-Indians on land not allotted and sold to non-Indi-
ans, particularly when a non-Indian contracts or conducts com-
mercial transactions with the tribe or tribal members.35
Several critics and commentators have argued that a narrow
application of Montana ignores a long line of Indian law cases
that preserve tribal power unless its exercise would be inconsis-
tent with the interests of the federal government. 6 In Brendale
v Confederated Yakima Indian Nation, Justice Blackmun argued
that Montana "must be read against the rich and extensive back-
ground of these cases." 7 According to Blackmun, Montana "con-
templates [ ] the exercise of civil jurisdiction over non-Indian
activities ... where those ... activities implicate a significant
tribal interest."38 Indeed, the Montana Court found that the
Crow Tribe lacked the authority to regulate non-Indian conduct
only because the tribe failed to plead that the conduct at issue, or
Montana's regulation thereof, affected any tribal interest.39
In order to resist a state's assertion of jurisdiction, therefore,
an Indian tribe must assert and substantially prove that state
authority threatens or directly implicates a tribal interest in: 1)
the political autonomy of tribal institutions, 2) the economic secu-
rity of the tribe, or 3) the general well-being of its members. An
unfortunate corollary of the Montana test is that the requirement
of affirmative pleading places a burden on Indian tribes to justify
jurisdiction." In contrast, state courts can generally assume ju-
risdiction over any matter in which they can assume valid per-
" Montana, 450 US at 557.
' Id at 565-66.
See Brendale v Confederated Yakima Nation, 492 US 408, 450 (1989) (Blackmun
concurring in part and dissenting in part), citing Washington v Confederated Tribes, 447
US 134, 153 (1980). See also Montana, 450 US at 566 n 16; William C. Canby, The Status
of Indian Tribes in American Law Today, 62 Wash L Rev 1, 15-16 (1987); Alvin J. Ziontz,
Indian Litigation, in Sandra L. Cadwalader and Vine Deloria, Jr., eds, The Aggressions of
Civilization 149, 176-77 (Temple, 1984).
3' Brendale, 492 US at 450 (Blackmun concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
39 Montana, 450 US at 558 n 6, 566 n 16. See also Brendale, 492 US at 459
(Blackmun concurring in part and dissenting in part).
" See Ziontz, Indian Litigation at 176-77 (cited in note 36).
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sonal and subject matter jurisdiction, regardless of whether the
litigation affects the state's general welfare.4 Despite its short-
comings, however, Montana provides useful substantive criteria
for determining whether state jurisdiction infringes upon tribal
authority within Indian Country.
C. Tribal Rights of Self-Government and the Tribal Courts
An essential element of tribal self-government is the estab-
lishment and development of tribal courts. The Court recognized
this in Williams when (after finding that the tribal court could
hear the suit and provide a remedy) it refused to extend state
jurisdiction, holding that to do so would infringe on the right of
self-government by undermining the authority of tribal courts.42
Combining this principle with Supreme Court dicta implying that
a state may obtain jurisdiction over a matter arising out of Indi-
an Country where a tribe has not established a system of self-
government,43 state courts have, however, permitted state court
civil jurisdiction where tribal courts do not exist.4
In National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v Crow Tribe of
Indians, the Supreme Court established procedural safeguards to
ensure that federal courts do not infringe upon tribal rights of
self-government by usurping the jurisdiction of the tribal
courts." Specifically, federal courts can review tribal court juris-
diction under 28 USC § 1331 only after the parties fully exhaust
all available tribal court remedies.46 The Court reasoned that
the federal policy of encouraging tribal self-government and the
development of tribal courts demands that the "forum whose
jurisdiction is being challenged [be given] the first opportunity to
evaluate the factual and legal bases for the challenges."4'
" See generally 21 CJS Courts §§ 54-64 (1990).
4' 358 US at 223. See also Note, State Jurisdiction over Indians as a Subject of Feder-
al Common Law: The Infringement-Preemption Test, 21 Ariz L Rev 85, 100 (1979) (dis-
cussing the Williams infringement test).
4 See McClanahan, 411 US at 167-68.
See Wildcatt v Smith, 69 NC App 1, 316 SE2d 870, 876 (1984); R.G. v W.M.B., 159
Wis 2d 662, 465 NW2d 221, 224-225 (Wis App 1990) (holding that a state court that had
properly acquired jurisdiction prior to the creation of the tribal court continued to exercise
valid jurisdiction over the matter-an exception to the general rule that the existence of a
tribal court precludes state court jurisdiction).
4' 471 US 845 (1985)..
41 Id at 856-57; Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v LaPlante, 480 US 9, 16 (1987) (diversity
case; same rule applied).
4' National Farmers Union, 471 US at 856.
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The Supreme Court found that tribal courts are the most
appropriate forum to determine jurisdiction in light of the par-
ticularized circumstances of tribal sovereignty. 4 A tribe's rights
of self-government may have been diminished or qualified over
the years. On the other hand, treaties and federal statutes may
ensure specific rights, such as off-reservation hunting and fishing
rights. The Supreme Court recognized the advantages of requir-
ing parties to exhaust tribal court remedies: in the event of feder-
al judicial review, federal courts can draw on the Indian court's
expertise in such matters.49
The Supreme Court has thus consistently held that tribal
rights of self-government prevent the extension of state court
jurisdiction into Indian Country. The Montana test enumerates
several substantive elements of the tribal rights of self-govern-
ment upon which a state court cannot infringe. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court requires that federal courts defer to tribal self-
government prerogatives by refusing to hear a case until litigants
exhaust tribal court remedies. The exhaustion doctrine preserves
the inherent tribal rights of self-determination by presuming
tribal court civil jurisdiction over reservation-based suits unless
Congress unequivocally legislates to the contrary."
48 Id at 855-56.
" Id at 857. Here, Congress's grant of general federal question jurisdiction, 28 USC §
1331 (1988), served as the basis for federal review of tribal court jurisdiction.
' See note 22; Williams, 358 US at 223 ("If this power is to be taken away from
them, it is for Congress to do it.").
It is extremely unlikely that Congress will ever divest the tribal courts of this juris-
diction. While Congress has reduced the scope of tribal authority in the past, see Act of
August 15, 1953, Pub L No 83-280, 67 Stat 588 (1953), codified at 28 USC § 1360 (1988)
(requiring certain states to assume concurrent jurisdiction over civil matters arising out of
Indian Country, while providing all other states with the option of assuming civil ju-
risdiction over Indian Country on their own initiative), Congress amended Public Law 280
in 1968 to require tribal consent for the extension of state jurisdiction and to establish
provisions for the retrocession of state jurisdiction. Act of April 11, 1968, Pub L No 90-
284, 82 Stat 73, 78-81 (1968), codified at 25 USC § 1321-23, 1326 (1988). See also Rosebud
Sioux Tribe v South Dakota, 900 F2d 1164, 1174 (8th Cir 1990). Moreover, the federal
government has encouraged tribal self-govbrnment and the development of competent
tribal judicial institutions since approximately 1968. See William C. Canby, Jr., American
Indian Law in a Nutshell 52-56 (West, 1988) (discussing the history and ultimate aban-
donment of the federal government's "termination" policy-under which the federal
government sought to terminate federal benefits and support services to certain tribes and
force the dissolution of reservations). The Indian Self-determination and Education
Assistance Act, for example, directed the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
and the Department of the- Interior to include provisions in contracts for tribes to ulti-
mately assume responsibility of federal Indian programs. See 25 USC §§ 450-450n, 455-
458e (1988). Federal infringement on tribal rights of self-government is extremely unlike-
ly so long as such federal policies and programs are in place, and thus the exclusive
jurisdiction of tribal courts over civil cases arising within Indian country and involving
1994]
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II. ENFORCING A STATE COURT ORDER AGAINST AN INDIAN
DEBTOR: DOES "No LAW" MEAN "No PROBLEM" FOR STATE
COURT JURISDICTION?
Williams v Lee resolves many state/tribal jurisdictional con-
flicts clearly: where state court jurisdiction infringes upon tribal
rights of self-government, plaintiffs must bring suit in the tribal
court.5 In Williams, a non-Indian store owner who did business
within the Navajo Nation brought an action for debt against a
Navajo couple. The Supreme Court held that state court jurisdic-
tion over the civil suit would "indermine the authority of the
tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence would infringe on
the right of the Indians to govern themselves."52
Williams does not provide guidance in all debt collection
cases, however. Suppose that an Indian living and working in
Indian Country enters into a contract with a non-Indian outside
the boundaries of her reservation and subsequently defaults on
her obligations.53 The state trial court has subject matter ju-
risdiction over the underlying litigation because the Indian defen-
dant and the non-Indian plaintiff transacted business outside of Indi-
an Country.' After the trial court enters judgment against the
Indian defendant, the non-Indian plaintiff may seek to enforce
the judgment by securing a writ of garnishment and serving it on
the Indian defendant's employer on the reservation. If the rele-
vant tribal code neither permitted nor prohibited the garnish-
ment of a tribal member's on-reservation wages, would the writ
infringe the tribal rights of self-government? Lower federal courts
and state courts are divided on this issue. This section analyzes
the case law addressing this "no law" problem-primarily those
cases involving the garnishment of an Indian's on-reservation
wages to enforce a valid state court judgment.
Indian defendants seems secure.
"' 358 US at 220. Compare Oliphant v Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 US 191 (1978)
(tribal courts may not criminally prosecute non-Indians).
52 358 US at 223.
Living on a reservation within a state's borders does not constitute sufficient
minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction. Nenna v Moreno, 132 Ariz 565, 647 P2d 1163,
1164 (Ariz App 1982); Flammond v Flammond, 190 Mont 350, 621 P2d 471, 473 (1980).
' Mescalero Apache Tribe v Jones, 411 US 145, 148-49 (1973); Organized Village of
Kake v Egan, 369 US 60, 75 (1962) ("State authority over Indians is [ more extensive
over activities ... not on any reservation.").
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A. Imagining a World Without Tribes: Narrowly Construing the
Tribal Rights of Self-Government
In the absence of a congressional act granting a state civil
jurisdiction over Indian Country, the Williams Court asked
"whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them" to deter-
mine whether a state could assert such jurisdiction." When ap-
plying the Williams infringement test, Montana and Wisconsin
state courts narrowly construe the two components of the tribal
rights of self-government-the right to address issues through
legislation and the right to be ruled by tribal law. They conclude
that state court jurisdiction over the enforcement of a state court
order in Indian Country does not infringe upon the tribal rights
of self-government.56
1. The right to create tribal law.
Applying state law that unambiguously contravenes tribal
law clearly infringes upon the tribal rights of self-government.57
Montana and Wisconsin state courts have applied what they
believe to be a corollary of that proposition: if there is no written
tribal law addressing the underlying issue, then the tribal court
is not exercising its tribal rights of self-government, and state
court jurisdiction therefore does not impinge upon the tribal
rights of self-government.
In Little Horn State Bank v Stops, the defendants contested
the Montana state trial court's jurisdiction to enter a writ of
execution authorizing the garnishment of their on-reservation
income.58 The relevant tribal code did not provide for the attach-
ment of property by non-Indian lenders.59 The Montana Su-
preme Court held that enforcing the state court judgment against
358 US at 220.
See, for example, Little Horn State Bank v Stops, 170 Mont 510, 555 P2d 211
(1976); R.G., 465 NW2d 221.
' See, for example, Geiger v Pierce, 233 Mont 18, 758 P2d 279, 280-81 (1988).
5 170 Mont 510, 555 P2d 211, 212 (1976). The Montana state trial court obtained
personal jurisdiction over the Indian defendant through service of process on the Crow
reservation. See Dixon v Picopa Construction Co., 160 Ariz 251, 772 P2d 1104, 1113 (1989)
(holding that tribal sovereignty demands that service of process be made in accord with
tribal law). But see State Securities, Inc. v Anderson, 84 NM 629, 506 P2d 786, 787-88
(1973) (holding that service of process according to state law does not infringe upon tribal
sovereignty). See also Robert Laurence, Service of Process and Execution of Judgment on
Indian Reservations, 10 Am Ind L Rev 257, 259-268 (1982).
9 555 P2d at 214.
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the Crow defendants did not interfere with the tribal rights of self-
government because the Crow Tribal Code was silent.0 Wis-
consin state courts similarly equate tribal self-rule with express
manifestations of tribal legislative authority, holding that state
court jurisdiction infringes upon tribal sovereignty only where a writ-
ten tribal law addresses the issue in controversy.6
1
The Montana and Wisconsin courts look to the relevant trib-
al code to determine whether tribal law precludes state court
jurisdiction.62 In First v LaRoche, the South Dakota Office of
Child Support Enforcement sought to enforce a South Dakota
judgment against an Indian defendant through URESA63 proce-
dures authorizing the Montana Child Support Enforcement Divi-
sion ("Montana CSED") to act on its behalf. Montana CSED
attempted to intercept the Indian defendant's unemployment in-
surance benefits to satisfy the South Dakota judgment. The rele-
vant tribal code, the Fort Peck Tribe's Comprehensive Code of
Justice, § 304(b) and § 311, addressed the execution of the state
child support order, arguably providing the plaintiff a remedy."
The First court distinguished the remedies at tribal law and state
law to find that the Montana CSED's administrative action did
not interfere with tribal legislative authority. Specifically, the
court found that the tribal code did not specifically "provide for
income withholding proceedings against a tribal member's off-
reservation income to enforce a child support obligation."66
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Trieweiler challenged the
majority's assumption that a tribal code must, at a minimum,
provide remedies equivalent to state law remedies to preclude
60 Id.
6 See R.G., 465 NW2d at 224 (finding no tribal code provision addressing paternity
and child support and no tribal court to adjudicate the claim at the time the suit was
filed); Jacobs v Jacobs, 138 Wis 2d 19, 405 NW2d 668, 672 (Wis App 1987) (tribal code
was silent on issue of domestic relations); County of Vilas v Chapman, 122 Wis 2d 211,
361 NW2d 699, 702 (1985) (no motor vehicle provisions in tribal code).
See especially Iron Bear u District Court, 162 Mont 335, 512 P2d '1292, 1299 (1973)
(adding a third prong to the infringement-preemption test: "whether the Tribal Court is
currently exercising jurisdiction in such a manner as to preempt state jurisdiction").
The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) is a model act
requiring all adopting states to enforce foreign support orders against absentee parents
within their boundaries. See, generally, Margaret Campbell Haynes and G. Diane Dodson,
Interstate Child Support Remedies 63-65 (ABA Center on Children and the Law, 1989).
See also Kulko v California Superior Court, 436 US 84, 98-99 (1978).
247 Mont 465, 808 P2d 467 (1991). Although First rejected the Iron Bear test, it
applied the same analytical framework by inquiring into the adequacy of the tribal court
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state court jurisdiction. Justice Trieweiler argued that Montana
could effectively "substitute its system of [laws] for the tribal
system" by merely finding the tribal code deficient in light of the
specific case.67 The lower court had similarly noted that, on the
plaintiff's reasoning, if a state government creates a mechanism
for adoption that differs only slightly from the tribal adoption
law, the state courts could assert jurisdiction over the proceed-
ings without infringing upon tribal legislative authority.8
Justice Trieweiler's concerns are borne out by Wisconsin
Supreme Court precedent, which determines whether tribal law
precludes state authority by asking whether the tribal code is
sufficiently similar to state law. For example, the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court assessed the sufficiency of traffic regulations in the
Menominee Law and Order Code by asking whether they sub-
stantially mirrored Wisconsin traffic regulations.69 Thus, in Wis-
consin and Montana, state law is the benchmark by which courts
determine whether a tribe is sufficiently exercising its self-
government rights so as to preclude state court jurisdiction.
2. The right to be ruled by tribal law.
The second element of the tribal rights of self-govern-
ment-the right to be ruled by tribal law7 -- poses difficult con-
ceptual problems for courts and commentators.- The determina-
tion of whether state jurisdiction infringes upon political liberty
is treacherous, as courts are unsure of how much deference to
afford tribal courts. Accordingly, some state courts struggle to fit
Indian tribes into a strict federal framework, resolving the
state/tribal court jurisdictional conflict by resorting to the famil-
iar federal system: a system uncomplicated by Indian tribes, and,
not surprisingly, unprotective of tribal interests.
Since the federal system requires states to 'defer only to
other states or to the federal government, only comity would pre-
clude the extension of state court jurisdiction into Indian Coun-
try. Under the principle of comity, a court will give effect to the
laws and holdings of another forum not as a matter of obligation,
Id at 475 (Trieweiler dissenting).
See First v LaRoche, 17 Ind L Rptr 5002, 5003 (Mont 1st Jud Dist 1989).
See, for example, State v Webster, 114 Wis 2d 418, 338 NW2d 474, 482 (1983)
(finding tribal regulations substantially similar to state regulations and therefore suffi-
cient to preclude state jurisdiction). See also County of Vilas, 361 NW2d at 702 (finding
that state regulation of traffic on an Indian reservation did not interfere with tribal
sovereignty where the tribe had no traffic code).
71 See Williams, 358 US at 220.
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but out of deference and mutual respect.7' Little Horn State
Bank adopted a narrow view of the right of Indians to be ruled
by their own laws, reasoning that it would have to recognize
Indian tribes as "sister states" to defer to the authority of the
Crow Tribe over its members and property within the reservation
boundaries.72 The court concluded that respecting the tribe's
right to refuse enforcement of the judgment would be anomalous
because the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not apply to Indi-
an tribes.73 Moreover, the Little Horn State Bank court stressed
that the "essential elements of a valid writ of execution existed"
and that Montana state court jurisdiction over the enforcement of
the judgment debt would be incontrovertible but for the Crow Reser-
vation. 4
State and federal courts are rightfully concerned with obliga-
tions imposed by state law and federal law; accordingly, Little
Horn State Bank evidences the Montana court's interest in pro-
viding the plaintiff a remedy. The Montana Supreme Court has
consistently held that Montana state law was the only source for
an adequate remedy to a plaintiff, and that the court had to
assume jurisdiction to ensure that the plaintiff's rights guaran-
teed by state law were not disregarded.75 In the view of the
Montana court, the tribal code's silence on the issue implicitly
validates and justifies the extension of state authority into tribal
land.
B. A World Where Tribes Are States: The Navajo Debt Col-
lection Cases
Arizona state courts and some federal courts interpret tribal
rights of self-government more broadly, analogizing the tribal
rights of self-government to the sovereign powers of a state in
" Brown v Babbitt Ford, Inc., 117 Ariz 192, 571 P2d 689, 695 (Ariz App 1977). See
also Hilton v Guyot, 159 US 113, 163-64 (1895).
72 555 P2d at 212.
7' Id (treating the tribe on an "even par" with the states "would not be feasible, since
the Crow Tribe does not provide for the honoring of state court judgments, nor is the full-
faith [sic] and credit clause applicable to the tribe"). For a discussion of full faith and
credit and Indian tribes, see William V. Vetter, Of Tribal Courts and "Territories". Is Full
Faith and Credit Required?, 23 Cal W L Rev 219, 269-72 (1987) (arguing that tribal court
judgments should be recognized under principles of comity); Comment, Recognition of
Tribal Decisions in State Courts, 37 Stan L Rev 1397, 1412-17 (1985); Robert N. Clinton,
Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, 1989 Harv Ind L Symp 17, 70-75 (arguing that
tribal court judgments should be given full faith and credit).
7 555 P2d at 212.
7. Id at 215.
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cases involving the enforcement of state court judgments within
the Navajo Nation.76 Although the Navajo Tribal Code provides
several methods of enforcing judgments, it does not provide for
garnishment of on-reservation wages. The Navajo Tribal Code
allows a Navajo District Court to enter judgments77 as well as
writs of execution.78 The Navajo court may attach livestock and
other property, but the Navajo Tribal Council repealed the tribal
law providing for the garnishment of wages within Navajo terri-
tory.7
9
A federal district court may not execute a writ of garnish-
ment where a state or territory does not provide for the attach-
ment of wages. Garnishment is a statutory remedy which did not
exist at common law and does not exist now in all jurisdic-
tions.8" In First National Bank of Boston v Santisteban, the
First Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court's refusal
to attach future wages because Puerto Rican law did not provide
for garnishment of future wages as a means to satisfy judg-
ments.8 In an action for execution of a judgment at the federal
level, Rule 69(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure respects
the authority of state governments and directs federal district
courts to look to state law for possible remedies.82 Rule 69(a) is
merely procedural and cannot enlarge or abridge substantive
rights defined by state law." Where there is no controlling fed-
eral statutory law, the district court has the same authority to
enforce judgments as that provided to state courts under local
law.'
7 See Joe v Marcum, 621 F2d 358, 361-62 (10th Cir 1980); United States v Morris,
754 F Supp 185, 187-88 (D NM 1991); Begay v Roberts, 167 Ariz 375, 807 P2d 1111, 1114-
17 (Ariz App 1990).
77 7 Nay TC § 701 (Supp 1984-85).
78 7 Nav TC § 705 (Supp 1984-85).
79 9 Nay TC § 1303 (1978) (authorizing garnishment of wages for the enforcement of
child support orders), repealed by 9 Nav TC § 711 (Supp 1984-85).
Joe, 621 F2d at 361.
s, 285 F2d 855 (1st Cir 1961). The district court cited this decision in Morris, 754 F
Supp at 186.
' Such proceedings "shall be in accordance with the practice and procedure of the
state in which the district court is held, existing at the time the remedy is sought. ... "
FRCP 69(a).
' See 28 USC § 2072(b) (1988); Argento v Village of Melrose Park, 838 F2d 1483,
1487 (7th Cir 1988) ("the federal rules neither create nor withdraw jurisdiction"); Kashi v
Gratsos, 712 F Supp 23, 25 (S D NY 1989).
' Goldman v Meredith, 596 F2d 1353, 1357 (8th Cir 1979). See also Marshak v
Green, 746 F2d 927, 931 (2d Cir 1984); Duchek v Jacobi, 646 F2d 415, 417 (9th Cir 1981);
Crosson v Conlee, 745 F2d 896, 903-04 (4th Cir 1984).
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Case law involving Rule 69(a) and debt collection reflects the
conflict-of-laws principle that a court must respect another
jurisdiction's affirmative choice not to provide a certain remedy.
In Northwest South Dakota Production Credit Association v
Smith ("PCA"), the Eighth Circuit reasoned that a federal court
must similarly defer to tribal preferences regarding remedies and
enforcement mechanisms in a suit brought by off-reservation
creditors for a debt owed by Indians on a reservation.' A feder-
al statute authorizing the mortgage and alienation of reservation
trust land provided that such mortgages and foreclosures were to
be made "in accordance with the laws of the State or Territory in
which the land is located." 6 The court concluded from the statu-
tory language and legislative history of 25 USC § 483(a) that
there was no federal court jurisdiction over the mortgaging or
foreclosure of Indian trust land.
The PCA court rejected the creditor's argument that the
federal court was the only forum in which it could obtain relief
because the creditor had "not presented its claim to the Chey-
enne River Sioux Tribal Court."87 The court stated that the trib-
al court "appears ... to be the proper forum" and that it should
decide whether it had jurisdiction over the action." While the
PCA court applied the doctrine of exhaustion which had been es-
tablished only a year before in National Farmers Union,9 other
courts had recognized tribal courts as the appropriate forums
prior to National Farmers Union."
In sum, a court's view of the "no law" problem depends on
the court's conception of the tribal rights of self-government. The
784 F2d 323 (8th Cir 1986). Similarly, in Joe, 621 F2d at 361-62, the Tenth Circuit
analogized Indian tribal governments to state governments and held that the state could
not exercise a writ of garnishment in Indian Country without tribal authorization. See
also Morris, 754 F Supp at 187. Courts have afforded tribes status equal to states with
respect to specific statutes. See Tracy v Superior Court, 168 Ariz 21, 810 P2d 1030, 1038-
46 (1991); Martinez v Superior Court, 152 Ariz 300, 731 P2d 1244, 1247-48 (Ariz App
1987).
8 784 F2d at 324, quoting 25 USC § 483(a) (1988).
87 Id at 327.
' Id. See also Santisteban, 285 F2d at 856. In that case, the bank argued that its
only remedy would be a federal court order obliging the debtor to pay or be held in con-
tempt of court. The appellate court stated tersely that "the United States District Court is
not a collection agency" and it could not endorse a remedy not provided by Puerto Rican
law. Id.
89 471 US 845, 857 (1985).
See, for example, American Indian National Bank v Red Owl, 478 F Supp 302, 305
(D SD 1979); Flammond v Flammond, 190 Mont 350, 621 P2d 471, 474 (1980). Compare
Schantz v White Lighting, 502 F2d 67, 69-70 (8th Cir 1974) (denying federal jurisdiction
where the tribal code expressly refused jurisdiction over the controversy).
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Montana-Wisconsin line of cases interprets the tribal rights of
self-government narrowly, demanding a clear showing that state
court jurisdiction would contradict an unequivocal expression of
tribal governmental authority. The Navajo Debt Collection cases
analogize tribal governmental authority to state sovereignty,
holding that tribes have the prerogative not to provide a remedy
provided by state law.
III. OUTLINING THE SCOPE OF TRIBAL RIGHTS OF SELF-
GOVERNMENT
In Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v LaPlante, the Supreme
Court stated in dicta that the tribal rights of self-determination
could prevent the extension of state court jurisdiction where the
relevant tribal code is silent." Specifically, when federal law has
not clearly narrowed tribal rights of self-determination, "the
proper inference from [tribal] silence ... is that the sovereign
power.., remains intact."2 Like Williams, Iowa Mutual explic-
itly recognized that tribal rights of self-government may some-
times trump state (and federal) interests. However, the Supreme
Court did not elaborate precisely which "sovereign power[s] re-
main[ I intact."93 Because the Court has failed to define clearly
the tribal rights of self-government, the two lines of cases ad-
dressing the enforcement of state court orders in Indian Country
have misconstrued those rights.
A. Analysis of the "No Law" Cases
The Navajo Debt Collection cases improperly characterize the
tribal right of self-government; the Supreme Court has clearly
stated that Indian tribes are not states. 4 The tribal rights of
self-government are different from the sovereign rights of a state.
For example, Indian tribes are not subject to constitutional limi-
tations on state action. The Bill of Rights does not apply to
Indian tribes.9" On the other hand, the federal government can
91 480 US 9, 18 (1987).
Id, quoting Merrion v Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 US 130, 148-49 n 14 (1982).
See Comment, The Indian Battle for Self-Determination, 58 Cal L Rev 445, 473
(1970) (analyzing Williams).
See, for example, White Mountain Apache Tribe v Bracker, 448 US 136, 143 (1980);
United States v Kagama, 118 US 375, 379 (1886).
Talton v Mayes, 163 US 376, 385 (1896).
However, the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 USC § 1302 (1988), places similar
restraints on tribal governmental actions.
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define and limit the extent to which an Indian tribe may exercise
its sovereignty.97 The Court has stated that the federal govern-
ment assumes a trust relationship when dealing with "these
dependent and sometimes exploited people" and must fulfill "mor-
al obligations of the highest responsibility and trust."98
The ancient origins and extra-constitutional status of Indian
tribes demand different relations and obligations between the
federal government and Indian tribes than between the federal
government and states. In the seminal Cherokee cases, Chief
Justice Marshall looked to international law principles set forth
by the French political theoretician Emmerich de Vattel and
concluded that Indian nations were political bodies vested with
the rights of self-government.99 De Vattel defined a sovereign
state as a nation that "governs itself ... without any dependence
on a foreign power."00 Thus, despite the loss of some "national"
powers, Indian tribes retain the inherent tribal rights of self-
determination 1 by maintaining a status distinct from both
state and federal government.0 2
Just as courts that treat Indian tribes as states ignore clear
Supreme Court holdings rejecting such a view, courts that sup-
plement tribal code remedies with state law remedies ignore the
Supreme Court's consistent holdings against the application of
state law in Indian Country.0 3 The Supreme Court has recog-
nized that "[t]he policy of leaving Indians free from state jurisdic-
tion and control is deeply rooted in the Nation's history."0 4 The
Montana-Wisconsin line of cases fails to respect the fact that the
inherent tribal rights of self-government displace state law, even
within the state's boundaries.
The inherent tribal rights of self-determination vest tribal
courts with jurisdiction over reservation-based civil suits even
where tribal courts have not yet exercised that jurisdictibn. °5 A
' See Kagama, 118 US at 383-84. See also notes 22 and 49.
" Seminole Nation v United States, 316 US 286, 296-97 (1942).
See Worcester v Georgia, 31 US (6 Pet) 515, 560-61 (1832).
" Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations 16 (Dublin, 1792).
101 See Cohen, Handbook at 122-23, 273-74 (cited in note 4); Canby, 62 Wash L Rev at
1-2 (cited in note 36). See also United States v Wheeler, 435 US 313, 328 (1978).
" For example, the Iroquois National Lacrosse team traveled to the 1990 World La-
crosse Championships in Australia on passports issued by the Iroquois Grand Council of
Chiefs. United Press International Wire, Iroquois Participation Takes Lacrosse Champion-
ships Back to Roots (June 24, 1990).
103 See Iowa Mutual, 480 US at 18.
,0 Rice v Olson, 324 US 786, 789 (1945).
10 See, for example, Fisher v District Court, 424 US 382, 390 (1976) (per curiam).
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tribe may not have addressed the subject of the litigation, but
"sovereign power, even when unexercised,... will remain intact
unless surrendered in unmistakable terms.""' Furthermore, the
exhaustion doctrine, by requiring that tribal courts make the
initial jurisdictional decision, implies that the absence of a writ-
ten tribal law is not dispositive as to whether the tribe retains
the authority to address the issue in controversy." 7
A recognizing forum can execute a judgment where recogni-
tion would be "compatible with the maintenance of comity among
courts."' In the spirit of mutual respect, and as mandated by
URESA, the First court showed great deference to the South
Dakota child support order. However, the court disregarded Su-
preme Court precedent recognizing the primacy of tribal courts.
Under Iowa Mutual and National Farmers Union, respect for
tribal courts demands that an initial jurisdictional inquiry be
made in the tribal courts. Federal courts direct plaintiffs to ex-
haust their tribal court remedies in recognition of the fact that
tribal courts are responsible for enforcing tribal law within Indi-
an Country.
Finally, applying state law in "no law" cases undermines
tribal legislative authority because it effectively requires a tribe
to legislate in a contextually specific manner that is not only
unreasonable but also impossible.' 9 Justice Trieweiler's dissent
in First was correct: if applying state law does not infringe upon
the tribal rights of self-government where the tribal code does
not specifically address a certain situation, a state court can
extend state authority into Indian Country without violating the
Williams infringement test."0 Yet Montana and Wisconsin prec-
edent permits courts to ignore the inherent rights of self-deter-
mination and coerce tribal governments to adopt state law in
their tribal codes.
Merrion v Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 US 130, 148 (1982).
'' See National Farmers Union, 471 US at 856-57.
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 82(2) (1982).
'o9 That a statute cannot anticipate all of its applications is reflected by the accep-
tance of the proposition that judges do not merely judge, but must also legislate. See, for
example, Southern Pacific Co. v Jensen, 244 US 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes dissenting)
("[Jiudges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially; they are confined
from molar to molecular motions.").
"' See Margery H. Brown and Brenda C. Desmond, Montana Tribal Courts: Influenc-
ing the Development of Contemporary Indian Law, 52 Mont L Rev 211, 282 (1991).
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B. Applying the Montana Test to the Enforcement of State Court
Judgments in Indian Country
Under the Montana "test" for state/tribal jurisdictional con-
flicts, state court civil jurisdiction infringes on the tribal rights of
self-government where it has an "effect on the political integrity,
the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.""
Permitting the assertion of state civil jurisdiction in the "no law"
scenario is objectionable because it undermines the "political in-
tegrity" of tribal councils and tribal courts. Tribal courts have
experienced dramatic development during the period of self-de-
termination and can provide effective forums for enforcing judg-
ments."' As a result of the deliberate effort to develop tribal
courts and increase the sophistication of tribal governments,"'
tribal courts and tribal law now embody the tribal rights of self-
government. Thus, a state court that refuses to acknowledge the
jurisdictional prerogative of tribal courts or the authority of tribal
law wrongly disregards the tribal rights of self-government.
Commentators have often ignored tribal rights of self-govern-
ment, emphasizing instead that federal law or policy preempts
the extension of state court jurisdiction into Indian Country."'
In McClanahan v Arizona State Tax Commission, the Supreme
Court stated that "the trend has been away from the idea of in-
herent Indian sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and to-
ward reliance on federal pre-emption."" 5 Although the Court's
emphasis on federal preemption properly limited the extension of
state jurisdiction into Indian Country, now is the appropriate
time for a more comprehensive definition of the "tribal rights of
self-government" that respects tribal political and legal institu-
tions as vested with rights of self-determination.
Tribal courts are the appropriate forums for the enforcement
of state court orders-even in a "no law" situation. Accordingly,
state courts should direct plaintiffs to seek relief in the relevant
.. Montana, 450 US at 566. See also text accompanying notes 32-33.
11 Montana courts had recognized this fact several years before in Flammond, 621
P2d at 474. The Montana Supreme Court has since reverted to its former distrust and
misunderstanding of tribal courts and their role in cases like First v State, 247 Mont 465,
808 P2d 467, 471 (1991).
11 In 1990, there were approximately 150 tribal courts in the United States, and the
number is increasing. H. Ted Rubin, Tribal Courts and State Courts: Disputed Civil Juris-
diction Concerns and Steps Toward Resolution, 14 State Ct J 9, 9 (Spring 1990).
11 See Earl Mettler, A Unified Theory of Indian Tribal Sovereignty, 30 Hastings L J
89, 112-20 (1978); Note, 21 Ariz L Rev at 88-89 (cited in note 42).
115 411 US at 172.
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tribal court. Tribal court jurisdiction preserves tribal political
integrity consistent with the holding in Montana v United States.
1. Political integrity and tribal councils.
Felix Cohen described self-government as "that form of gov-
ernment in which decisions are made... by the people who are
most directly affected by the decisions.""6 The Indians who are
affected by tribal council decisions elect tribal council representa-
tives. Tribal councils in turn attempt to determine which laws
are most appropriate to circumstances within Indian Country
and legislate accordingly.
The council's authority to provide or deny certain remedies to
a creditor in a suit against an individual under the tribe's au-
thority is a necessary aspect of tribal self-government. For exam-
ple, in Babbitt Ford, Inc. v Navajo Indian Tribe, the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals held that an off-reservation plaintiff could
not repossess an Indian defendant's automobile where Navajo
tribal law required the defendant's consent to do so." 7 The Na-
vajo Tribal Council invalidated unilateral repossession of automo-
biles because it endangered "the health and safety of tribal mem-
bers" by leaving them stranded "miles from [their] nearest neigh-
bor.",8
If the tribal rights of self-government are to be more than
hollow rhetoric, tribal legislative authority must include the pre-
rogative not to address an issue through legislative action. A
tribal council undoubtedly exercises tribal rights of self-govern-
ment by affirmatively enacting a tribal law. Deciding not to legis-
late on an issue is also an exercise of the rights of self-govern-
ment. If a state court could extend its laws into Indian Country
by providing a remedy by default, then state courts can deny
tribal councils the prerogative of not legislating on a particular
issue.
2. Political integrity and tribal custom.
The right not to legislate on issues is particularly important
in Indian Country. For centuries, Indians have resolved internal
disputes through unwritten customs and traditions."' The pref-
it6 Felix S. Cohen, Indian Self-Government, in Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., ed, Red Power:
The American Indians' Fight for Freedom 17-18 (Nebraska, 1971).
117 710 F2d 587 (9th Cir 1983).
"' Id at 593.
See, for example, Karl N. Llewellyn and E. Adamson Hoebel, The Cheyenne Way
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ace to the Navajo Tribal Code emphasizes this point, warning
that "[o]ne should not expect to find all Navajo Tribal laws to be
contained within these volumes."2 ' Considering written tribal
codes to be the sole source of tribal law is unrealistic because
tribal custom may trump written tribal law as well as state law.
For example, in In re the Marriage of Napyer, the Yakima Na-
tional Tribal Court recognized a traditional wedding ceremony (a
"Yakima wedding trade") that was contrary to the 1953 Law and
Order Code of the Yakima Indian Nation. 2' The Tribal Court
refused to apply the Tribal Code provisions for marriages and
marriage dissolution because they conflicted with the Washat
religion and therefore were irreconcilable with federal and tribal
law protecting tribal custom and traditions.'22
Courts should be careful to consider the tribal interest in
preserving tribal tradition and custom-essential elements of the
legacy of tribal self-government-when analyzing the "no law"
problem. 2 ' The federal government has recognized the impor-
tance of tribal custom and has enacted laws to ensure that Na-
tive American culture and tradition will be preserved. By not
incorporating certain clauses of the Bill of Rights into the Indian
Civil Rights Act, and by modifying others, Congress recognized
the tribal interest in maintaining custom and tradition.' The
Supreme Court has also manifested its respect for the tribal
interest in being ruled by tribal tradition and local law.'25 By
directing plaintiffs to exhaust all their remedies at tribal courts,
the exhaustion doctrine ensures that tribal customs and tradition
will be taken into account in the resolution of the dispute.
Although tribal custom and tradition are integral elements of
tribal self-government, lower courts often relegate tribal court ju-
risdiction to matters traditionally resolved by tribes or preserved
in treaties entered into over one hundred years ago. The "formal-
(Oklahoma, 1941).
'2' Nav TC at ix (1977).
121 19 Ind L Rptr 6078 (Yak Tr Ct 1992).
'2 Id at 6079. The Tribal Code was adopted in 1952 with guidance from the Bureau of
Indian Affairs.
" United States v Wheeler, 435 US at 331; Chino v Chino, 90 NM 204, 561 P2d 476,
479 (1977).
'24 25 USC §§ 1301-03 (1988). See Janis v Wilson, 385 F Supp 1143, 1150 (D SD
1974), remanded on other grounds, 521 F2d 724, 729 (8th Cir 1975). See also McCurdy v
Steele, 353 F Supp 629, 632-33 (D Utah 1973), reversed on other grounds, 506 F2d 653
(10th Cir 1975).
in See Carney v Chapman, 247 US 102 (1918) (holding a customary tribal marriage is
legally valid); Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 US 556, 571 (1883).
[61:707
1 Tribal Rights of Self-Government
ized in treaty" standard is unreasonable in most situations con-
sidering that the federal government stopped making treaties
with Indian tribes in 1871126 and could not have contemplated
the modern dilemmas tribes currently confront. For example, in
First, the court denied the Fort Peck Tribe the exclusive right to
collect child support through income withholding because the
Fort Peck Treaty did not guarantee it such a right.'27 The feder-
al government did not endorse income withholding until 1984, so
it is not surprising that it did not address the matter in Indian
treaties over one hundred years earlier.'28
3. Political integrity, tribal courts, and Anglo-American
notions of efficient government.
Even where the issue in controversy does not seem to be
governed by tribal custom or tradition, assuming that tribal
courts cannot respond to the issue undermines the authority of
tribal courts. Non-Indian courts project western values of the
proper role of legislatures and courts when denying tribal courts
the chance to hear a matter of first impression. Tribal courts can
be very pragmatic and resolve civil disputes by following proce-
dures and applying substantive law different from state court
procedure and substance. For example, in Descheenie v Mariano,
the Navajo Supreme Court established a formula for determining
child support in the absence of a Tribal Code provision.'29
We realize that we are treading on legislative ground by
setting up these guidelines. However, in the absence of trib-
al council action, we must do our best to fairly resolve the
disputes that come before us, and establish a uniform pat-
tern for resolving those disputes. This is not the first time
we have set guidelines when the tribal council has failed to
legislate. 3 '
Furthermore, tribal courts have a unique institutional capability
to resolve disputes in light of different cultural, social, and po-
litical norms. Tribal courts are able to "bridge the gap between
'" Cohen, Handbook at 66-67 (cited in note 4). The federal government continues,
however, to enter into "agreements" with Indian tribes. Id at 67.
27 808 P2d at 471. See also Application of Otter Tail Power, 451 NW2d 95, 102 (ND
1990) (holding that an 1867 treaty did not guarantee the tribe the right to regulate
utilities).
1" See Wehunt v Ledbetter, 875 F2d 1558, 1569-70 (11th Cir 1989) (Clark dissenting).
'' 15 Ind L Rptr 6039, 6039-40 (Nav Sup Ct 1988).
"'D Id at 6039 (citations omitted).
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law and Indian culture."'' Thus, the Navajo Supreme Court in
Descheenie analyzed standard legal principles ("the best interests
of the child"), tribal custom ("Navajo custom obligates each Nava-
jo parent to provide for the support of his or her child"), and the
current political and economic circumstances of the tribe ("the
vast spectrum of social and economic groups existing within the
Navajo Nation") to calculate an absentee father's child support
obligation."2
The exhaustion doctrine embraces the notion that the tribal
rights of self-government necessarily encompass the right of
tribes to address new circumstances as they develop through the
law. 3 ' This is consistent with the Supreme Court's analysis of
state/tribal jurisdiction, which has "never turned on whether the
particular area being regulated is one traditionally within the
tribe's control."'34 Although some treaties provided for contin-
ued self-government over internal affairs, 3 ' state jurisdiction is
precluded absent an Act of Congress and the consent of the tribe.
Thus, the exhaustion doctrine ensures that the tribal right of
self-government will not be reduced to "a set of rights minutely
fixed in the concrete of history."3 6
State courts should respect tribal legislative and judicial
authority regardless of tribal code silence on the issue by direct-
ing a creditor to tribal court to enforce her judgment. Although it
may appear unfair to direct a creditor to secure relief in a juris-
diction whose law does not explicitly provide the same remedies
as state law, the desire for identical remedies does not justify
infringements on the tribal rights of self-government. In other
words, ignoring tribal prerogatives implicates concerns greater
... Orville N. Olney and David H. Getches, Indian Courts and the Future: Report of
the National American Indian Court Judges Association 93 (National American Indian
Court Judges Association, 1978).
15 Ind L Rptr at 6039-40.
' See Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez, 436 US 49 (1978); Judith Resnik, Dependent
Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U Chi L Rev 671, 709 (1989).
" Rice v Rehner, 463 US 713, 739 (1983) (Blackmun dissenting), citing Ramah
Navajo School Board v Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico, 458 US 832 (1982) (state cannot
tax Indian school board); Moe v Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 US 463 (1976) (cigarette
tax); Mescalero Apache Tribe v Jones, 411 US 145 (1973) (ski resorts on reservation; state
tax upheld in part). Although the language of Rice includes "traditional authority" analy-
sis, 463 US at 722, the decision is arguably based primarily on a congressional grant of
authority to states. See id at 723, 726.
35 See Vine Deloria, Jr. and Clifford M. Lytle, The Nations Within: The Past and
Future of American Indian Sovereignty 4 (Pantheon, 1984).
"' Perry Dane, The Maps of Sovereignty: A Meditation, 12 Cardozo L Rev 959, 968
(1991).
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than creditors' rights. State court jurisdiction in the "no law"
scenario contravenes the federal policy of encouraging tribal self-
government. Moreover, the application of state creditor-debtor
law undermines tribal efforts to create an environment conducive
to economic development consistent with tribal needs and expec-
tations. Federal policy and tribal interests in economic self-deter-
mination demand that state courts direct a non-Indian creditor to
the appropriate tribal court regardless of whether the tribal code
explicitly provides the same remedy as state law.
As a practical matter, the creditor is likely to be afforded
some relief in tribal court. Some tribal courts provide a creditor
with a state or federal law remedy through their choice-of-law
provisions. In the "no law" situation, the Navajo Tribal Code
directs tribal courts to seek the applicable law in the customs
and usages of the Nation, then in federal laws and regulations,
and finally, in the laws of the state "in which the matter in dis-
pute may lie.""3 7 The Navajo Nation did not pursue economic
activity prior to 1923, so there is no substantive common law
regarding tribal debts or obligations. However, evidence suggests
that tradition and custom played, and perhaps continue to play, a
large role in the issuing and repayment of personal debt.' 38 If
there is no Navajo customary law regarding personal debt obli-
gations, then the Navajo District Court may afford the debtor the
same kinds of relief as granted under Arizona, New Mexico, or
Utah state law.
In sum, the Supreme Court has stated that state court juris-
diction is invalid where it infringes upon the tribal rights of self-
government. Accordingly, state court jurisdiction over the en-
forcement of state court orders in Indian Country should be in-
valid because it infringes upon the tribal rights of self-govern-
ment. Enforcing state court judgments where there is no remedy
at tribal law threatens the political integrity of tribal govern-
ments and undermines the authority of tribal courts. At the same
time, however, respecting the tribal rights of self-government and
preserving creditors' rights need not be mutually exclusive en-
deavors. A state court can accomplish both objectives by directing
' 7 Nav TC § 204 (Supp 1984-85).
See Paul E. Frye, Lender Recourse in Indian Country: A Navajo Case Study, 21
NM L Rev 275, 289-91 (1991). But see Michael D. Lieder, Navajo Dispute Resolution and
Promissory Obligations: Continuity and Change in the Largest Native American Nation, 18
Am Ind L Rev 1, 17-23, 55-60 (1993) (arguing that virtually all of Navajo contract law is
rooted in Anglo-American legal principles).
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the non-Indian plaintiff to seek enforcement in the appropriate
tribal court.
CONCLUSION
In light of Supreme Court precedent and the important role
tribal courts play in the exercise of tribal self-rule, state court
judgments should be enforced through tribal court proceedings to
ensure that the political liberty of Indian tribes is not threatened.
To the extent that state civil jurisdiction denies tribal courts the
opportunity to apply unwritten law and custom, state civil juris-
diction undermines an integral element of tribal court authority.
Tribal rights of self-government and the enforcement of state
court judgments are complementary in achieving the mutually
shared interests in justice-not only in the immediate litigation,
but also in the greater context of federal Indian policy. By fairly
considering the tribal interests in the political autonomy of tribal
institutions, the economic security of the tribe, and the general
well-being of tribal members when determining whether state
civil jurisdiction infringes upon the tribal rights of self-govern-
ment, courts can ensure that ours will not be a world without
Indian tribes.
